
For both consumer and commercial IP networks, security is a huge concern. The ability of unscrupulous individuals and groups to penetrate and exploit networks is the subject of intense scrutiny for most organizations and network providers. An entire field of security professionals work tirelessly across government and corporate networks to monitor, detect, and respond to network threats or security breaches. In spite of these risk controls, network intrusions continue to be a major risk to IP networks worldwide. As a recent example, the US Department of Defense announced they had spent USD$100MM to mitigate the impact of multiple attacks on its network infrastructure in just the last six months. In addition the Department of Defense announced it was establishing a new “cyber command” to defend against Internet attacks from adversaries and the White House announced the appointment of a cybersecurity czar to oversee US government network security.
In their security and risk blog last week, Forrester identified the need for end-point security when implementing IP enabled SCADA networks in the “smart grid”. This is certainly a good call given the risk of inadvertent or inappropriate use of the network by end users. The larger view of security, however, should go beyond just end-point security into multiple layers of risk control including application layer security, prevention of device corruption on the SCADA network (e.g., insertion of malicious code), security of all interconnections to the public Internet and partner networks, and intrusion detection systems.
The ubiquitous nature of power systems, the number of network enabled devices on the “smart grid” and the economic/strategic importance of the power networks dictate the importance of a comprehensive risk evaluation and implementation of a suite of robust risk controls. The networks of infrastructure providers, including SCADA networks, are major targets for espionage and hackers. Only last month US intelligence officials revealed that foreign intruders had penetrated the networks of US electricity providers in an effort to map critical infrastructure components. These intruders also reportedly left behind malicious payloads. Like the corporate networks of power providers, SCADA networks are also targets for exploitation. According to a recent article in Aviation Week, DARPA is weaponizing battlefield wireless network attack tools designed to penetrate and disrupt the operation of all types of networks, including SCADA networks.
The recent history of network penetrations and the deliberate design of disruption tools indicate a growing risk profile for the networks that control and manage the power grid. The upgrade of SCADA networks into the scalable IP based “smart grid” that Cisco suggests in their new product line will certainly represent a great enhancement enabling new tools and capabilities for both power providers and consumers alike. However, without implementation of multiple layers of security in these new enhanced networks, the risks could very easily outweigh the benefits.





